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INTRODUCTION
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is the highest adminis-
trative tribunal responsible for deciding immigration and nationality
matters in the United States.' In 2002, the Department of Justice is-
sued administrative reforms that dramatically altered the procedures
governing appeals before the BIA. This controversial restructuring
changed the traditional system of review by a three-member panel to
permit review by a single Board member. This member may now issue
an Affirmance Without Opinion (AWO) if he or she finds that the
initial factfinder-the Immigration Judge (IJ)-reached the correct
result.2 The Board member may issue an AWO even if there are short-
comings in the IJ's reasoning, provided that any errors are considered
to be harmless or immaterial.3
Following the implementation of these reforms, a circuit split de-
veloped regarding whether the courts may review the BIA's decision to
issue an AWO. The First, Third, and Ninth circuits hold that judicial re-
view is proper because the BIA's decision to affirm without opinion is
not committed to agency discretion by law.' Under the Administrative
t A.B. 2003, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 2007,The University of Chicago.
I See Executive Office for Immigration Review Practice Manual § 1.2, online at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/chapl.pdf (visited June 7,2006).
2 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(i) (2006). Administrative immigration proceedings are adjudi-
cated by individual IJs and are reviewed by the BIA under the authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral. See John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal Proceed-
ings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 Georgetown Immig L J 605, 612 (2004). For a more general
overview, see Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman, and Stephen Yale-Loehr, 8 Immigration Law
and Procedure §§ 104.05,104.13 (Matthew Bender rev ed 2005).
3 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).
4 See, for example, Haoud v Ashcroft, 350 F3d 201, 206 (1st Cir 2003) (holding that "the
Board's own regulation provides more than enough 'law' by which a court could review the
Board's decision to streamline"); Smriko v Ashcroft, 387 F3d 279, 294 (3d Cir 2004) ("We hold
that the issues addressed by single BIA members under § 1003.1(e)(4)(i) of the streamlining
regulations are not committed to agency discretion and that the resolutions of those issues are
judicially reviewable."); Falcon Carriche v Ashcroft, 350 F3d 845,852-53 (9th Cir 2003) (rejecting
"the government's argument that the streamlining decision is inherently discretionary" and
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Procedure Act's (APA) judicial review scheme, the action is therefore
presumptively reviewable. The Eighth and Tenth circuits disagree, find-
ing that the BIA's employment of the AWO procedure is discretionary
and thus exempt from the APA's general presumption of review."
This Comment attempts to resolve the circuit split by considering
the binding strength of the regulations allowing a single Board mem-
ber to issue an AWO decision. The Comment argues that because
these regulations are legislative rules and therefore binding on the
agency and the courts, a Board member's decision to affirm without
opinion is not committed to agency discretion by law. Accordingly, the
courts may review the agency action at issue in the split.
Part I briefly outlines the BIA's governing procedures and its
function as an appellate body. Part II explores the circuit split and pre-
sents the arguments on each side. Part III concludes that the Supreme
Court's decision in Heckler v Chaney is not dispositive on the issue at
bar in the circuit split. Instead, this Part proposes that review of AWO
decisions should be analyzed in light of the regulation's characteristics
as a legislative rule.
I. THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
The BIA is the senior administrative body responsible for the ad-
judication of immigration issues. The agency's form and regulations
have undergone multiple restructurings since its inception. This Part
traces the evolution of the BIA to its current state, addressing its pri-
mary duties, responsibilities, and governing procedures.
A. Duties and Responsibilities of the BIA
Since its creation in 1940, the BIA's primary task has been to act
in an appellate role and to provide a standardized reading of immigra-
tion and nationality laws.8 Consequently, the BIA has nationwide ju-
risdiction to review the orders of Js and the immigration-related deci-
concluding instead that the decision to affirm without opinion is a nondiscretionary determina-
tion that is subject to ordinary judicial review).
5 See 5 USC §§ 701-06 (2000).
6 See, for example, Ngure v Ashcroft, 367 F3d 975, 983 (8th Cir 2004) (holding that "the
BIA's decision whether to employ the AWO procedure in a particular case is committed to
agency discretion and not subject to judicial review"); Tsegay v Ashcroft, 386 F3d 1347, 1355-56
(10th Cir 2004) (agreeing with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Ngure).
7 470US821(1985).
8 See Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of
Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 Stan L & Policy Rev 481, 499-500
(2005).
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sions made by the Department of Homeland Security.9 The BIA's find-
ings are binding on all respective parties and, through the process of indi-
vidual adjudication, the agency creates legal precedent by which to guide
Us, the Department of Homeland Security, and the general public.'
Prior to 1999, a three-member panel conducted the reviews of IJ
and Immigration and Naturalization Service decisions. These members
were authorized to carry out a de novo review of the record and to
make their own conclusions as to facts and law, as well as whether dis-
cretionary relief should be granted." In 1999, however, the Attorney
General radically revised the BIA's process of review through the
promulgation of regulations intended to cope with a growing backlog
of the agency's cases. These regulations sought to reduce the agency's
caseload by "streamlining" the appellate review process. This meant
that in certain circumstances the regulations enabled a single Board
member to affirm an U's order without opinion. The effect of these
regulations, as well as the additional round of reforms issued in 2002,
will be discussed below.
As a final note, all BIA decisions are subject to the discretion of
the Attorney General. The Immigration and Nationality Act" (INA)
made explicit that the Attorney General's decisions on "all questions
of law" relating to immigration and naturalization were "controlling."'"
In turn, the Attorney General has used the immigration courts and the
BIA to carry out this function.'5 And, although the hierarchical rela-
9 In March 2003, the functions of the former immigration enforcement agency-the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service-were transferred from the Department of Justice to the
newly created Department of Homeland Security. See Guendelsberger, 18 Georgetown Immig L
J at 612 (cited in note 2).
10 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(g). See also Cruz, 16 Stan L & Policy Rev at 499 (cited in note 8)
(exploring how BIA decisions can shape immigration proceedings and jurisprudence).
11 See Cruz, 16 Stan L & Policy Rev at 499 (cited in note 8) (quoting the former Board
Chairman Thomas Finucane's description of the BIA's powers: the agency has the ability to
"make a de novo review of the record and make[] its conclusions and findings irrespective of
those made by the [H]").
12 See 8 CFR §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(i), 1003.1(h). These regulations delegate to the Board discre-
tionary authority as broad as the statute confers on the Attorney General. See also Accardi v
Shaughnessy, 347 US 260, 266-67 (1954) ("[T]he scope of the Attorney General's discretion
became the yardstick of the Board's."). This detail is critical in determining judicial standards of
review in light of United States v Mead, 533 US 218 (2001), because Board members are vested
with the requisite authority such that their pronouncements must be accorded the same defer-
ence that is due to the Attorney General. See, for example, INS v Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US 415,
425 (1999) (recognizing that "the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives am-
biguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication")
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
13 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC §§ 1101-1537 (2000 & Supp 2005).
14 Id § 1103(a)(1).
15 See Cruz, 16 Stan L & Policy Rev at 499 (cited in note 8) (describing the relationship
between the BIA and the Attorney General).
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tionship between the BIA and the Attorney General has concerned
some members of the legal community, history has shown that the
agency retains considerable independence from the Attorney General
when deciding matters of immigration relief.'6
B. Streamlining Rules
Between 1992 and 2000, annual appeals to the BIA increased
from 12,823 to 29,972.7 During that time, the BIA's backlog jumped
from 18,054 pending cases to 63,763." In an effort to reduce this grow-
ing backlog, the Attorney General promulgated new rules in October
of 1999 to govern the BIA's proceedings."
The streamlining regulation, as it was called, authorized the
agency's Board Chairman to designate certain categories of cases as
suitable for review by a single Board member.'° Specifically, the mem-
16 See id.
17 See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to
Improve Case Management (2003), online at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/
DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDEpdf at 13 (visited June 7,2006) ("Dorsey & Whitney Report").
18 See id at 13. The Dorsey & Whitney Report found that the backlog of cases at the BIA
was caused by three factors: (1) the BIA's increased caseload; (2) the frequent, significant
changes in United States immigration laws; and (3) the number of members and other staffing
issues at the BIA. See id.
The Dorsey & Whitney Report also introduced the following conclusions, which are relevant
to the current debate on the empirical implications of the 2002 reforms: (1) a surge of appeals in
the appellate courts evidences the dissatisfaction of immigrants with the quality of decisions in
the aftermath of the 2002 reforms; (2) after the reforms, the BIA's reversal rates dropped from
one in four to approximately one in ten, indicating fewer wins for aliens; and (3) by March 2002,
more than half of the BIA's decisions were AWOs, thus forcing the courts to decipher a challeng-
ing record that likely involves reviewing the IJ's opinion. See id at 42.
Appellate courts reviewing BIA proceedings have been finding widespread error in cases
where a single Board member misused the AWO procedure. See, for example, Benslimane v
Gonzales, 430 F3d 828,829 (7th Cir 2005) (internal citations omitted):
In the year ending on the date of the argument, different panels of this court reversed the
[BIA] in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board
that were resolved on the merits. The corresponding figure, for the 82 civil cases during this
period in which the United States was the appellee, was 18 percent. Our criticisms of the
Board and of the immigration judges have frequently been severe.
According to the Seventh Circuit, this high reversal rate reflects a mounting concern that
"the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum stan-
dards of legal justice." Id at 830. See also Chen v United States Department of Justice, 426 F3d 104,
115 (2d Cir 2005) (rejecting an IJ finding that was "grounded solely on speculation and conjec-
ture"); Ssali v Gonzales, 424 F3d 556,563 (7th Cir 2005) ("This very significant mistake suggests
that the Board was not aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner's] case."). The Benslimane
court also pronounced that the BIA's action "appear[ed] to have been completely arbitrary." 430
F3d at 833. Although outside the scope of this Comment, if individual Board members are over-
whelmingly making decisions in defiance of the regulations, it is possible that this may raise rule
of law concerns.
19 See 8 CFR §§ 3.1(a), 3.2(b)(3) (2000) (codifying "Streamlining Rules").
20 See id § 3.1(a)(7)(i).
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ber to whom the case was assigned could affirm an I's decision with-
out opinion if she determined that
the result reached in the decision ... was correct; that any errors in
the decision ... were harmless or nonmaterial; and that (A) the is-
sue on appeal is squarely controlled by existing Board or federal
court precedent and does not involve the application of precedent
to a novel fact situation; or (B) the factual and legal questions
raised on appeal are so insubstantial that three-Member review is
not warranted."
Although affirming an order without opinion did not necessarily "im-
ply approval of all the reasoning of [the] decision" under the stream-
lining rules, it signified that "any errors in the decision of the [I]"
were considered to be "harmless or nonmaterial."2
In the first two years of implementing the streamlining rules, the
BIA significantly reduced its backlog of cases. Continuing this effort,
the Attorney General in February 2002 proposed new regulations in-
tended to eliminate the remaining backlog, improve efficiency, and
enable the agency to provide more meaningful guidance to IJS and
practitioners.5 These regulations, entitled "Procedural Reforms to Im-
prove Case Management," were adopted in final form on August 26,
2002. They made five significant changes to the BIA's governing pro-
cedures that remain in effect today.
First, the regulations amended the circumstances under which an
AWO can and should be issued. The regulations set forth:
The Board member to whom a case is assigned shall affirm the
decision of the Service or the immigration judge, without opinion,
if the Board member determines that the result reached in the
decision under review was correct; that any errors in the decision
under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and that (A) The is-
sues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board or fed-
eral court precedent and do not involve the application of prece-
dent to a novel factual situation; or (B) The factual and legal is-
sues raised on appeal are not so substantial that the case war-
rants the issuance of a written opinion in the case."
21 Id § 3.1(a)(7)(ii).
22 Id § 3.1(a)(7)(iii).
23 See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management,
67 Fed Reg 7309,7310 (2002).
24 Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed Reg 54878,54878 (2002), codified at 8 CFR § 1003 (2006).
25 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(i) (2006).
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Although similar to the 1999 provision, the above language was
changed from allowing the BIA to streamline a case to requiring the
procedure if the delineated criteria were present." Furthermore, the
last condition of the provision was amended. In 1999, it provided for
an affirmance without opinion when "[t]he factual and legal questions
raised on appeal are so insubstantial that three-Member review is not
warranted.""7 In contrast, the new regulations change the definition of
insubstantial from "when three-member review is not warranted" to
when "the case [does not] warrant[] the issuance of a written opinion."
Nevertheless, as with the situation under the 1999 streamlining rules,
when the BIA issues an AWO, it "approves the result reached in the
decision below; it does not necessarily imply approval of all of the rea-
soning of that decision, but does signify the Board's conclusion that
any errors in the decision of the immigration judge or the Service
were harmless or nonmaterial."" The practical effect of this regulatory
scheme is that, unless a single Board member opts to decide a given
case on the merits or designate it for three-member review, the IJ's
order becomes the final agency action and the courts may scrutinize
the order as they would a decision by the BIA.9 In turn, the BIA is
accountable for any errors the IJ may have made.'°
Second, the regulations direct that single-member adjudication is
the default procedure of the BIA and that three-member panels are
warranted only in the following situations: (1) to settle inconsistencies
among IJ rulings; (2) to establish precedent; (3) to review a legal error;
(4) to resolve a case or controversy of major national import; (5) to
review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an IJ; or (6) to
reverse the decision of an IJ other than one where reversal is "plainly
consistent" with intervening law.1 Therefore, all appeals are to be de-
26 This is evident by comparing the language of the regulations. In 1999, the regulations
read: "The Chairman may designate ... permanent Board members who are authorized, acting
alone, to affirm decisions of Immigration Judges and the Service without opinion." 8
CFR § 3.1(a)(7)(i) (2000) (emphasis added). These members "may affirm the decision of the
Service or the Immigration Judge, without opinion, if the Board Member determines that the
result reached in the decision was correct." 8 CFR § 3.1(a)(7)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added). In
contrast, after 2002, the regulations read: "[tlhe Board member to whom a case is assigned shall
affirm the decision of the Service or the immigration judge, without opinion, if the Board mem-
ber determines that." 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
27 8 CFR § 3.1(a)(7)(ii)(B) (2000).
28 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2006).
29 See id. See also Yuk v Ashcroft, 355 F3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir 2004) ("[T]he summary
affirmance regulations specifically provide that the IJ's decision is the final agency action.").
30 See Albathani v INS, 318 F3d 365,378 (1st Cir 2003) ("[If the BIA does not independ-
ently state a correct ground for affirmance in a case in which the reasoning proffered by the IJ is
faulty, the BIA risks reversal on appeal.").
31 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(6)(i)-(vi) (2006).
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cided by a single Board member unless the case fits within one of the
six categories considered appropriate for three-member review.
Third, the regulations expand those categories of cases that can
be summarily dismissed to include cases in which
[t]he Board is satisfied, from a review of the record, that the ap-
peal is filed for an improper purpose, such as to cause unnecessary
delay, or that the appeal lacks an arguable basis in fact or in law
unless the Board determines that it is supported by a good faith
argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.32
The decision to summarily dismiss a case is different, however, from a
decision to affirm without opinion. When a case is summarily dis-
missed, the BIA never makes a decision on the merits. But, similar to
the AWO procedure, this provision intends to eliminate quickly any
remaining backlog of cases by allowing a Board member to individu-
ally dispose of a higher volume of cases.
Fourth, the regulations restrict significantly the agency's scope of
review of Us' factual findings. Whereas the BIA had previously re-
viewed such findings de novo, the current regulations require the
agency to defer to US unless their decisions are clearly erroneous."
This standard is meant to underscore the role of the U as the primary
factfinder and eliminate the duplicative expenditure of resources in-
volved in successive de novo factual determinations."
Last, the regulations reduce the number of Board members from
twenty-three to eleven. This reduction in the size of the BIA is aimed
at improving the agency's "cohesiveness and collegiality," addressing
the concern that the BIA was being weighed down by its own size."
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE AWO PROCEDURE
After the streamlining regulations were promulgated, they were
challenged promptly on due process grounds.6 To date, however, all
circuit courts that have considered the issue have ruled that the AWO
procedure is adequate." Despite this unwillingness to invalidate the
32 Id § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(D).
33 Id § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
34 67 Fed Reg at 54889 (cited in note 24).
35 See id at 54893-94. It is also noteworthy that Board members are appointed at the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General. See 8 CFR § 1003.1(a)(1) (2006).
36 Going forward, this Comment uses the term "streamlining regulations" to mean the
amended AWO regulations promulgated in 2002, which in certain circumstances authorize a
single Board member to affirm without opinion an IJ's decision.
37 See Blanco De Belbruno v Ashcroft, 362 F3d 272,282-83 (4th Cir 2004); Zhang v United
States Department of Justice, 362 F3d 155, 157 (2d Cir 2004); Yuk v Ashcroft, 355 F3d 1222, 1232
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entirety of the regulation on due process grounds, some courts con-
clude that they have jurisdiction to review an application of the AWO
procedure in a particular case. Specifically, the First, Third, and Ninth
circuits maintain that they may review a Board member's decision to
affirm without opinion. Alternatively, the Eighth and Tenth circuits
hold that they are without jurisdiction to consider this challenge.3
The focal point of the courts' disagreement is whether the deci-
sion to affirm without opinion is within the unfettered discretion of
the agency. If it is, the courts lack jurisdiction to review the order un-
der the APA's "committed to agency discretion" exception to review-
able administrative action." Part II.A provides relevant background to
the APA judicial review scheme. Next, Part II.B presents the First,
Third, and Ninth circuits' view that Board members are bound by
nondiscretionary regulatory criteria and thus jurisdiction is both fea-
sible and required. Last, Part II.C introduces the Eighth and Tenth
circuits' position that the decision to issue an AWO is committed to
agency discretion by law and thus the courts lack jurisdiction to con-
sider whether the BIA has complied with its own regulations.
A. The APA's Judicial Review Scheme
To be subject to review under the APA, the action at issue must
be a "final agency action."° A final agency action is defined as both
"the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process" and "one
by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which
legal consequences will flow." 1 In the context of the AWO procedure,
if the BIA affirms without opinion, the IJ's order becomes the final
(10th Cir 2004); Loulou v Ashcroft, 354 F3d 706,708 (8th Cir 2003); Dia v Ashcroft, 353 F3d 228,
238 (3d Cir 2003) (en banc); Denko v INS, 351 F3d 717,729-30 (6th Cir 2003); Falcon Carriche v
Ashcroft, 350 F3d 845,850-51 (9th Cir 2003); Georgis v Ashcroft, 328 F3d 962,967 (7th Cir 2003);
Mendoza v United States Attorney General, 327 F3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir 2003); Soadjede v
Ashcroft, 324 F3d 830,832-33 (5th Cir 2003);Albathani v INS, 318 F3d 365,379 (1st Cir 2003).
38 For practical purposes it is important to note that even if jurisdiction exists, a court will
not always exercise review. For example, courts have indicated that in some cases it is unneces-
sary to review the Board's use of the AWO procedure because the court can resolve the case on
the merits by reviewing the I's decision. See Olowo v Ashcroft, 368 F3d 692,698 (7th Cir 2004)
(articulating that it makes no difference whether the AWO procedure was properly applied
when a court can review the IJ decision on the merits); Falcon Carriche, 350 F3d at 853 n 7 (stat-
ing that in some cases, review of the IJ decision on the merits and the decision to use the AWO
procedure "collapse[s] into one analysis"); El Moraghy v Ashcroft, 331 F3d 195, 206 (1st Cir
2003) (finding that review of a decision to issue an AWO decision was unnecessary where the
case was remanded on the merits).
39 See 5 USC § 701(a)(2).
40 5 USC § 704.
41 Bennett v Spear, 520 US 154,178 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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agency action and the decision to streamline becomes indistinguish-
able from the merits of the case."
Once an agency's action is final, the APA creates a strong pre-
sumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.'3 There
are two exceptions to this general presumption of reviewability: first,
if Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review, and
second, if the action in question is committed to agency discretion by
law." Whether Congress expressly intended to preclude judicial review
will necessarily depend on the facts of the challenged application, but
the courts involved in the split do not generally find this exception a
barrier to review.5 Accordingly, this Comment focuses on the second
exception, concerning actions committed to an agency's discretion.
This second exception to judicial review has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court in the case of Heckler v Chaney to apply in the
rare instances where "the statute is drawn so that a court would have
no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise
of discretion.!" The circuit split turns on the difficulty of interpreting
this declaration. As will be further discussed in Part III, however, de-
termining the binding force of the AWO regulation can help resolve
the split by guiding the courts in their "committed to agency discre-
tion" analysis.
42 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii); Falcon Carriche, 350 F3d at 855 (finding that streamlining
is consistent with judicial review primarily because the decision of the IJ serves as the final,
reviewable agency action). See also notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
43 See 5 USC § 704 ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.").
44 See 5 USC § 701(a).
45 See, for example, Smriko v Ashcroft, 387 F3d 279, 291 (3d Cir 2004) (concluding that
because "the INA clearly does not preclude review, we now turn to whether the relevant issues
are committed to agency discretion at law"); Tsegay v Ashcroft, 386 F3d 1347, 1354-55 (10th Cir
2004) (finding that no statute expressly precluded judicial review of the BIA's decision to affirm
without opinion).
46 470 US at 830. See also Webster v Doe, 486 US 592, 599-601 (1988) (discussing what it
means for an action to be "committed to agency discretion by law"); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402,410 (1971) (advancing the Court's first general explanation of the
meaning of § 701(a)(2)). There is some dispute about whether the committed to agency discre-
tion idea is exhausted by the "no law to apply" test articulated in Chaney. See, for example, Doe,
486 US at 608-10 (Scalia dissenting) ("The 'no law to apply' test can account for the nonreview-
ability of certain issues, but falls far short of explaining the full scope of the areas from which the
courts are excluded."); Hahn v Gottlieb, 430 F2d 1243, 1249-51 (1st Cir 1970) (suggesting and
applying a balancing test to assess whether agency actions are discretionary by law, including
factors such as the appropriateness of judicial review, the court's utility in safeguarding plaintiffs'
rights, and the court's impact on agency operations). A majority of the Supreme Court has indi-
cated, however, that the "no law to apply" test answers whether the agency action is committed
to discretion by law. Doe, 486 US at 599-4600 (citing Overton Park and Chaney to explain what it
means for an agency action to be discretionary by law).
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B. Judicial Review Is Permissible
The First, Third, and Ninth circuits assert that they may review a
Board member's decision to streamline a case.7 These circuits mainly
rely on interpreting the decision to apply the AWO procedure as an
action not committed to agency discretion by law. The primary justifi-
cation for this conclusion is that the decision to affirm without opinion
is subject to internal regulatory criteria. That is, a Board member may
not choose when to summarily affirm an IJ's order. Instead, the mem-
ber may issue an AWO only when certain conditions-spelled out in
the Code of Federal Regulations-are met: (1) if the underlying IJ
opinion was correct; (2) if any errors are harmless or nonmaterial; and
(3) if the issues on appeal were either squarely controlled by existing
precedent or were insubstantial." These circuits conclude that the exis-
tence of these limitations "provides more than enough 'law' by which
a court could review the Board's decision to streamline."9 Accord-
ingly, the proposition stated in Chaney-where a law "is drawn so that
a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's exercise of discretion," Congress is assumed to have "com-
mitted the decision making to the agency's judgment absolutely"'-is
inapplicable in the context of streamlining.1
But the existence of governing standards does not altogether un-
pack the issue of judicial review, for AWO decisions are not exclu-
sively discretionary or nondiscretionary determinations. They can in-
volve multiple issues, only some of which may be reviewable. For ex-
ample, in Falcon Carriche v Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit found that it
did not have jurisdiction to review whether the BIA properly stream-
lined a decision that contained discretionary and nondiscretionary fac-
tors, but in which only the discretionary factor was in dispute.3 Never-
theless, the court was careful to articulate that "[a]lthough we agree
with the government's ultimate conclusion [that the court had no ju-
risdiction over the instant case], we do not embrace the government's
47 See, for example, Haoud v Ashcroft, 350 F3d 201,206 (1st Cir 2003); Smriko, 387 F3d at
294; Chong Shin Chen v Ashcroft, 378 F3d 1081,1087-88 (9th Cir 2004).
48 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).
49 Haoud, 350 F3d at 206. See also Smriko, 387 F3d at 293-94 (stating that the streamlining
criteria "provide amply sufficient 'law' for courts to apply"); Chong Shin Chen, 378 F3d at 1088
(concluding that the streamlining rules are clearly nondiscretionary because each subsection can
only be invoked in specified circumstances); Denko v INS, 351 F3d 717, 731 (6th Cir 2003)
("[T]his argument for committing this decision [to streamline] to the agency's discretion is
doubtful because there are judicially manageable standards available to a reviewing court.").
50 470 US at 830-32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 See Haoud, 350 F3d at 206; Smriko, 387 F3d at 292-93.
52 350 F3d 845 (9th Cir 2003).
53 Id at 852-54.
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argument that the streamlining decision is inherently discretionary.
Indeed, portions of the streamlining decision are non-discretionary
determinations that we would ordinarily have jurisdiction to review."5
Thus, certain subsets of BIA decisions to streamline may be unreview-
able while others may remain reviewable. 5
Adding yet another wrinkle to the reviewability debate, several
other courts have considered whether a Board member properly im-
plemented the AWO regulation without addressing the jurisdictional
question at all. Two examples are Denko v INSr and Georgis v
Ashcroft, 7 in which the Sixth and Seventh circuits, respectively, as-
sumed that the BIA's decision to streamline was reviewable. In
Denko, the Sixth Circuit stated that "[the] argument for committing [a
BIA streamlining] decision to the agency's discretion is doubtful be-
cause there are judicially manageable standards available to a review-
ing court." This reasoning is consistent with the First, Third, and
Ninth circuits' conclusion that the regulations governing the BIA pro-
vide the clear and manageable standards necessary for judicial review,
and, therefore, the BIA's judgment is nondiscretionary by nature.
Similarly, in Georgis, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[w]ithout explic-
itly deciding this issue [of reviewability], we have upheld the BIA's use
of the streamlining procedure in a case whose facts presented no sub-
stantial issue of law and no basis for granting asylum." 9 But by previ-
ously upholding the use of the AWO practice, the court implicitly ac-
knowledged its jurisdiction to review a Board member's compliance
with its governing regulations.
Notwithstanding the Sixth and Seventh circuits' lack of explicit
endorsement, the courts that assert jurisdiction over a Board mem-
ber's decision to streamline a case conclude that the agency's regula-
tions do not allow for single Board members to make discretionary
decisions. Instead, the courts emphasize that the Attorney General
issued strict criteria for when the agency's authority must affirm with-
out opinion. ' By contrast, if the conditions required by the AWO
54 Id at 852-53.
55 It is noteworthy that another circuit split exists regarding the reviewability of an IJ
decision that contains both a reviewable and an unreviewable basis, which the BIA affirms with-
out opinion. For a discussion of this split, see Cuellar Lopez v Gonzalez, 427 F3d 492,495-97 (7th
Cir 2005) (describing the split and concluding that the proper disposition when an IJ opinion
contains both reviewable and unreviewable grounds is to remand the case back to the BIA so
that it may clarify the basis of its holding).
56 351 F3d 717 (6th Cir 2003).
57 328 F3d 962 (7th Cir 2003).
58 351 F3d at 731.
59 328 F3d at 967 (internal citation omitted).
60 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).
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regulation are not present, the individual Board member may issue an
order explaining the agency's position."' The regulations also permit
the Board member to reconsider or reopen a decision she previously
adjudicated, or even reverse a decision if "required by intervening
Board or judicial precedent."6 Or, provided that the case meets the
conditions specified for three-member review, the regulations allow
the Board member to designate the case for review by a three-
member panel. These four possibilities, however, are the only options
a Board member has when faced with an adjudicatory proceeding.
And, given that the BIA must adhere to the conditions of these guide-
lines, the First, Third, and Ninth circuits maintain that the agency has
fettered discretion to issue an AWO and this decision is subject to ju-
dicial review under the APA.
C. The AWO Decision Is Not Reviewable
The Eighth and Tenth circuits adhere to the view that they gener-
ally lack the power to review the BIA's decision to streamline a case.6.
These circuits advance the following arguments: (1) because agencies
have discretion to develop and administer their own procedural
rules-which may involve the complex allocation of agency re-
sources-the BIA's decisions are committed to agency discretion by
law; (2) because the AWO procedure is a case-management technique
rather than a course of action designed to confer special rights upon
aliens, any review of the decision to issue an AWO would disrupt the
agency's management of immigration appeals; and (3) because the
AWO provision plainly bars a Board member who issues an AWO
opinion from explaining the reasons for the affirmance, judicial review
would be impractical.6 This Part examines each explanation in turn.
First, these circuits indicate that the AWO procedure is "commit-
ted to agency discretion by law," within the meaning of the APA. 6 To
support this assertion, the courts cite Chaney for a different proposi-
tion than the First, Third, and Ninth circuits do; instead of using
Chaney as a benchmark against which to measure whether the regula-
tions provide sufficient "law" to judge the agency's actions, the Eighth
61 See 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(5) (explaining the procedure if the decision is not appropriate for
affirmance without opinion).
62 Id.
63 See Ngure v Ashcroft, 367 F3d 975,983 (8th Cir 2004) (holding that "the BIA's decision
whether to employ the AWO procedure in a particular case is committed to agency discretion
and not subject to judicial review"); Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1355-56 (agreeing with the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Ngure). See also Garcia-Melendez v Ashcroft, 351 F3d 657, 662-63 (5th Cir
2003) (refusing to review the BIA's use of the AWO procedure).
64 See Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1355-57; Ngure, 367 F3d at 983-84.
65 See Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1355-58; Ngure, 367 F3d at 983-88.
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and Tenth circuits emphasize that the complicated task of balancing
resources unique to the agency carries significant weight in discerning
whether a meaningful standard for judicial review exists.6 However,
these circuits reason that "an administrative agency's decision about
how to allocate its scarce resources to accomplish its complex mission
traditionally has been free from judicial supervision."6 Taken together,
these two factors weigh heavily in favor of categorizing the BIA's de-
cision to issue an AWO as an action committed to agency discretion
by law.
The Eighth and Tenth circuits next consider the nature of the
streamlining regulations. They conclude that the regulations are a
case-management technique created for the BIA to manage its
caseload." To support this classification, the circuits cite the Depart-
ment of Justice's rationale behind implementing the AWO procedure:
The [streamlining] process is a reasonable response to the cur-
rent situation, because it allows the Board to concentrate its re-
sources on cases where there is a reasonable possibility of rever-
sal, or where a significant issue is raised in the appeal, while still
providing assurances that correct results are achieved in all cases
under the Board's appellate jurisdiction. 69
According to the Eighth Circuit, this justification suggests that the
regulation is a procedural mechanism by which to expedite review and
focus the attention of three-member panels on cases that require a
more searching inquiry into the decision below. ° Furthermore, the
Eighth Circuit points out that the regulation that creates the AWO
appears in a section of the Code of Federal Regulations entitled "Case
management system," again indicating that the rules were designed to
structure the agency's procedural needs." These factors lead the
Eighth and Tenth circuits to conclude that the decisionmaking practice
was adopted as a management tool, and, because judicial review is
generally circumscribed when "'a procedural rule is designed primar-
ily to benefit the agency carrying out its functions,' rather than 'in-
66 See Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1355 (noting that whether a decision is committed to agency discre-
tion by law depends on the context of the procedure and the "nature of the administrative action
involved," such as whether the procedure is a case-management technique); Ngure, 367 F3d at 982
(discussing when Chaney applies).
67 Ngure, 367 F3d at 983. See also Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1355 (noting that "it is well-settled
that agencies have discretion to develop case management techniques that make the best use of
their limited resources").
68 See Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1356: Ngure, 367 F3d at 983-84.
69 Ngure, 367 F3d at 984, quoting 64 Fed Reg 56135,56138 (1999). See also Tsegay, 386 F3d
at 1356, quoting 64 Fed Reg at 56138.
70 See Ngure, 367 F3d at 983. See also 64 Fed Reg at 56137.
71 Ngure, 367 F3d at 984, quoting 8 CFR § 3.1(e).
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tended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon indi-
viduals,"'" the BIA retains discretion to administer the regulation as it
sees fit.
Last, the courts put forth a pragmatic argument: "[A]s the Supreme
Court has emphasized, an agency decision made without statement of
reasons creates practical difficulties for judicial review.'73 This is be-
cause "it is practically impossible for a court to defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations, unless the agency gives some
explanation for its decision." But because the regulation at issue ex-
plicitly prohibits the BIA from providing an explanation for its deci-
sions, the court has no feasible way to assess the propriety of an affir-
mance without opinion without remanding the case to determine why
the agency chose to apply the procedure in the first place." In doing
so, however, the court would be creating new rules for the BIA and
contravening those already in existence.
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The circuit split turns on the question of when agency action is
committed to discretion by law and is thus unreviewable by the courts.
Courts on both sides of the split cite Chaney to guide their analyses of
this inquiry.6 Yet, the courts do not mention that there is a critical
question left unanswered by the Chaney Court: whether binding rules
of conduct promulgated under an agency's legislative authority pro-
vide sufficient law to support judicial review.
72 Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1355, quoting American Farm Lines v Black Ball Freight Service, 397
US 532, 538-39 (1970) (favoring judicial review where agency rules are intended to confer pro-
cedural benefits on individuals). See also Ngure, 367 F3d at 983 ("[O]ur review of the text, struc-
ture, and history of the streamlining regulations leads us to conclude that the Attorney General
surely did not intend to create substantive rights for aliens in the determination whether a par-
ticular decision of an J was affirmed without opinion.").
73 Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1356, citing ICC v Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 US 270,
283 (1987) (finding that actions are committed to agency discretion when it is not possible to
devise an adequate standard of review). See also Ngure, 367 F3d at 984 (noting that judicial
review of the BIA's streamlining decision would have "'disruptive practical consequences' for
the Attorney General's administration of the alien removal process") (internal citation omitted).
74 Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1357. Compare Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 US at
283-84 (noting that it would be unworkable for a court to review for abuse of discretion when a
decision is made without a statement of reasons), with Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 461 (1997)
("[A]n agency's interpretation of [its own regulations] is ... controlling unless plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.").
75 See Tsegay, 386 F3d at 1357.
76 See, for example, Smriko v Ashcroft, 387 F3d 279, 292 (3d Cir 2004) (contrasting the
streamlining regulations with the Supreme Court's "no law to apply" test in Chaney); Ngure v
Ashcroft, 367 F3d 975, 982 (8th Cir 2004) (citing Chaney as a point of reference to determine
whether there is an adequate standard of review for an agency action).
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Given this oversight, this Part concludes that an application of
Chaney's framework is by itself inadequate to solve the disagreement at
the heart of the circuit split. Specifically, Part III.A argues that the cir-
cuits' reliance on Chaney overlooks important distinctions between the
AWO procedure and the nonenforcement proceeding at issue in
Chaney. Parts III.B and III.C propose a resolution to the circuit split.
First, Part III.B establishes that the regulation creating the AWO proce-
dure is a legislative rule. Next, Part III.C argues that this classification
should guide the courts in their "committed to agency discretion" analy-
sis. Put simply, whether the rule is of present binding effect strongly cor-
relates to whether the rule is committed to agency discretion by law.
Last, Part III.D illustrates the potential effect of this new framework
by analyzing two cases that characterize the poles of the split.
A. Misplaced Reliance on Heckler v Chaney
Prior to Chaney, the Supreme Court long recognized a presump-
tion in favor of the reviewability of agency actions." This presumption
encompassed action as well as inaction, based on the APA's inclusion
of the latter in its creation of a petitioner's right to review.8 In Chaney,
however, the Court departed from this precedent.
Chaney involved a group of death row inmates petitioning the
Court to order the Food and Drug Administration to take enforce-
ment action against the unapproved use of certain drugs in lethal in-
jections." The FDA's Commissioner had denied the petition because
he was uncertain of the agency's jurisdiction and because he did not
consider the action to be a productive use of the agency's discretion-
ary enforcement authority." In response, the Court held that the
Commissioner's decision not to undertake enforcement action should
be presumptively exempt from judicial review because of the practical
difficulties that would arise if the judiciary sought to review and su-
pervise an agency's decisions as to which violations of law to pursue
and which to ignore.8' In reaching this conclusion, the Court empha-
77 See, for example, Abbott Laboratories v Gardner, 387 US 136, 141 (1967) (finding that
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should
the courts restrict access to judicial review").
78 See 5 USC § 702 (authorizing review if an agency officer "acted or failed to act").
79 See 470 US at 823.
80 See id at 824-25, quoting the Commissioner's statement:
Generally, enforcement proceedings in this area are initiated only when there is a serious
danger to the public health or a blatant scheme to defraud. We cannot conclude that those
dangers are present under State lethal injection laws, which are duly authorized statutory
enactments in furtherance of proper State functions.
81 See id at 831-32 ("The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the
many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.").
20061 1033
The University of Chicago Law Review
sized several considerations, such as the agency's balancing of compli-
cated discretionary factors, institutional competency concerns, and the
nature of enforcement proceedings." These considerations contributed
to the Court's general conclusion that agency decisions to refuse en-
forcement are presumptively unreviewable." This presumption can be
rebutted only when Congress has established statutory guidelines cir-
cumscribing an agency's enforcement discretion."
The BIA's decisions to affirm without opinion share virtually
none of the characteristics of the FDA's decision that led the Court in
Chaney to institute a presumption of unreviewability and a "corollary
requirement of a heightened degree of discernible standards to rebut
the presumption."' Most significantly, in Chaney the Court set aside
the question of whether review would be available when an agency's
governing regulations prescribed its present and future conduct. In
doing so, the Court directly implied that judicial review might be pos-
sible when an agency's own regulations provided precise enforcement
guidelines.' This possibility is consistent with Chaney's broader mode
of analysis; for, in defending its curtailment of judicial review the
Court relied upon the distinction between positive law (meaning rules
of conduct laid down by a legislative authority) and mere enforcement
policy (meaning an agency's decisions regarding whether to pursue
certain violations of those rules).r At issue in Chaney was the latter,
but the Court provided no judgment as to whether judicial review
would be precluded if adequate law were available in the form of
agency regulations. And, as will be further discussed in the next Part,
the BIA's streamlining regulations fit the category of positive law
rather than enforcement policy.
Furthermore, "[i]n Chaney, the FDA had simply declined to take
action to pursue possible violations of a statute."m The Court upheld
this decision, reasoning that as "an agency generally cannot act against
each and every violation, only the agency can balance all of the vari-
82 See id.
83 See id at 832.
84 See id at 833 ("[I]n establishing this presumption [of unreviewability of agency nonen-
forcement decisions], Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the
statutory scheme that the agency administers.").
85 Robbins v Reagan, 780 F2d 37,44 (DC Cir 1985).
86 See Chaney, 470 US at 836 (noting that at issue in the case was a policy statement not
properly adopted by an agency rule). See also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 Notre
Dame L Rev 157, 171 (1996) ("[T]he core problem created by Chaney, which is the ability of
agencies to avoid judicial review of their regulatory policies by substituting enforcement guide-
lines for legislative rules, remains unsolved.").
87 See Bhagwat,72 Notre Dame L Rev at 176 (cited in note 86).
88 Robbins, 780 F2d at 46.
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ous factors in deciding how to expend its limited resources."" In con-
trast, the circuit split is comprised of cases in which the BIA makes
affirmative decisions based on specific regulations. Reviewing these
decisions therefore "does not implicate the concern that the court
should not force the agency to funnel its efforts in any one direction.
Rather, the court is simply ensuring a limited degree of fidelity to the
agency's own decision on how to use its resources," as promulgated
through its governing regulations."
In Chaney, the Court itself recognized this difference in two
places. First, the Court compared Chaney to Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park v Volpe," in which the Court declined to review the Secretary
of Transportation's approval of the building of an interstate highway
through a park in Memphis, Tennessee.2 In Chaney, the Court dis-
agreed with the lower court's application of Overton Park to the situa-
tion at hand, reasoning that "[r]efusals to take enforcement steps gen-
erally involve precisely the opposite situation [from affirmative acts of
approval under a statute that sets clear guidelines for determining
when such approval should be given], and in [the former] situation we
think the presumption is that judicial review is not available."" As in
Overton Park, at issue in the circuit split is a Board member's decision
to take an affirmative action based on a set of valid regulations] Ac-
cordingly, the presumption created by Chaney does not apply. Second,
the Chaney Court noted that "when an agency does act to enforce,
that action itself provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the
agency must have exercised its power in some manner."" Thus, the
FDA's refusal to exercise its powers must be treated differently from
when an agency has exercised its coercive power. In the context of the
circuit split, the BIA exercises its power by requiring its members to
apply a predefined set of rules to any given case. Such an action is
markedly different from discretionary inaction. This difference, how-
89 Id.
90 Id at 46-47. See also California Human Development Corp v Brock, 762 F2d 1044, 1048
n 28 (DC Cir 1985) (finding that Chaney does not bar a review of the reasonableness of agency
action, even if the agency was under no initial duty to undertake it).
91 401 US 402 (1971).
92 See id at 420-21.
93 470 US at 831.
94 It may be argued that there is no principled distinction between challenging a Board
member's decision to use the AWO procedure and the decision not to use a three-member panel.
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that the BIA's regulatory scheme sets forth clear,
binding guidelines for when a member is authorized to affirm without opinion and when she can
opt for a three-member panel. Both decisions involve an active exercise of the streamlining
regulations, the conditions of which are precisely specified. Furthermore, the Board member
must choose one procedure over the other, according to the facts or issues presented.
95 470 US at 832.
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ever, is collapsed in the courts' analyses of whether a Board member
properly issued an affirmance without opinion.
To summarize, the Court's analysis in Chaney does not answer
the question of whether the circuit courts may review a Board mem-
ber's decision to issue an AWO. Indeed, it actually maintains the pos-
sibility that the BIA's regulations, if they are binding, can serve as suf-
ficient "law" to guide the courts in a jurisdictional analysis. This possi-
bility provides the beginnings of a resolution to the circuit split. If the
BIA's streamlining regulations are binding, they may overcome
Chaney's presumption of unreviewability and serve as a viable basis
for judicial review. Accordingly, the courts must assess whether the
regulations creating the AWO procedure provide adequate indicia of
the Attorney General's intent to sharply circumscribe the BIA's en-
forcement discretion, or whether the provisions are simply suggestive
guideposts for the agency to take note of in its adjudication of cases.
B. The AWO Procedure Is a Legislative Rule
Whether the regulation that institutes the AWO decisionmaking
practice overcomes Chaney's presumption of unreviewability depends
on whether it is, in fact, a binding rule. The distinction between a
binding and a nonbinding rule is based on whether the regulation at
issue is "legislative" or "interpretive.' Legislative rules are capable of
having binding force on reviewing courts, whereas interpretive rules
are not.6 To distinguish between a legislative and an interpretive rule,
96 When classifying agency action, there is also a distinction between "rulemaking" and
"adjudication." In the present situation, streamlining provisions are "rules" by virtue of the fact
that they guide the agency's present and future proceedings. But a Board member's decision to
issue these rules in an individual case is an example of adjudication. The technicality of this
classification is, however, not as important as what kind of rule the streamlining regulation is;
whether the rule is legislative or interpretive determines its binding force and therefore guides
our jurisdictional analysis. For a general discussion on the difference between rulemaking and
adjudication, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 4 Administrative Law Treatise §§ 6.1, 8.1 (Aspen Law 4th
ed 2002).
97 The courts sometimes articulate this distinction as "substantive" versus "interpretive."
See, for example, White v Shalala, 7 F3d 296, 303 (2d Cir 1993) (discussing the interpre-
tive/substantive terminology). There is also a distinction between "policy statements" and "inter-
pretive" rules. See American Mining Congress v Mine Safety & Health Administration, 995 F2d
1106, 1111 (DC Cir 1993) (distinguishing "policy statements, rather than interpretive rules, from
legislative norms") (emphasis omitted). The Court in Chaney distinguished a policy statement
from a legislative norm by noting that although the policy statement at issue in the case indicated
that the agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative action, this directive
was attached to a rule that was never adopted. 470 US at 836. In contrast, the circuit split in-
volves formally adopted rules dictating how the BIA is to manage its appellate authority over
the review of immigration proceedings. This indicates that the relevant distinction is that of
legislative versus interpretive, rather than legislative versus policy statement.
98 See Kenneth Culp Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise § 6.4 at 324-25 (K.C. Davis 2d
ed 1979).
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the following question can be posed: does the agency exercise its
rulemaking power to "clarify an existing statute or regulation, or to
create new law, rights, or duties in what amounts to a legislative act"?'1
Put another way, "a legislative rule has the same binding effect as a
statute ......
Whether a rule seeks to "make law," however, is not always
clear.'°1 In order to account for this difficulty, in American Mining
Congress v Mine Safety & Health Administration,'  the D.C. Circuit
compiled a comprehensive list of questions to ascertain whether a rule
has "legal effect."' 3 These questions are:
(1) whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an
adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency
action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2)
whether the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal
Regulations, (3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its
general legislative authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively
amends a prior legislative rule.' '
The court stated that "[i]f the answer to any of these questions is
affirmative, we have a legislative, not an interpretive rule."'1' Following
this scheme, the streamlining regulations can be categorized as legisla-
tive rules in part because they are published in the Code of Federal
Regulations.0 ' Furthermore, the BIA exercised its legislative power in
99 White, 7 F3d at 303.
100 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.4 at 324 (cited in note 98).
101 See Community Nutrition Institute v Young, 818 F2d 943, 946 (DC Cir 1987) (quoting
authorities who describe the distinction between the legislative and interpretive rules as "tenu-
ous," "blurred," and "baffling").
102 995 F2d 1106 (DC Cir 1993).
103 In a case prior to American Mining, the D.C. Circuit also considered the extent to which
the disputed rule left the agency "free to exercise discretion" to be indicative of whether the rule
was binding. Community Nutrition, 818 F2d at 946. In its analysis, the court emphasized that the
relevant norm narrowly limited administrative discretion and thus was a legislative rule. See id at
947-48. Although the issue in Community Nutrition was distinguishing a policy statement from a
legislative rule, its actual description of a legislative rule has not been superseded. See American
Mining, 995 F2d at 1111 (noting that "restricting discretion tells one little about whether a rule is
interpretive," but the approach still stands to qualify a rule as legislative rather than a policy
statement). Because the streamlining regulations direct the BIA to affirm without opinion if and
when three conditions are met, they leave little room for a Board member to deviate from the
rule in future proceedings and therefore qualify the regulation as a legislative rule.
104 American Mining, 995 F2d at 1112. It is worth noting that the D.C. Circuit has extensive
experience discerning when disputed rules have "the force of law." See John F Manning, Nonleg-
islative Rules, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 893,893 (2004) ("[Tlhe D.C. Circuit's cases have laid extensive
groundwork for distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative rules.").
105 American Mining, 995 F2d at 1112.
106 See 8 CFR § 1003.1. In Health Insurance Association v Shalala, 23 F3d 412,423 (DC Cir
1994), the D.C. Circuit reduced but did not eliminate the weight given to publication as a factor.
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promulgating the rule, thus satisfying condition three of the American
Mining test.
An old but reliable blueprint to the conclusion that the streamlin-
ing regulations are binding is the Second Circuit's decision in National
Nutritional Foods Association v Weinberger.!° Weinberger addressed
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,' °  which provided: "The
authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of
this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this section, is vested in
the Secretary.""' No conditions were expressly imposed upon this ex-
pansive grant of authority, yet the court held that the provision author-
ized the FDA to issue legislative rules (1) defining the standards of evi-
dence that drug manufacturers must meet when called upon to dem-
onstrate the efficacy of their products in new drug applications, and
(2) dismissing without a hearing an application failing to meet these
standards." " The court also approved of the administrative determina-
tion of whether a product was a "new drug" within the meaning of the
Act."' In doing so, it reasoned that "the FDA may follow streamlined
procedures designed to avoid the endless delays [caused as a result of
case-by-case enforcement proceedings] that have tended to paralyze
adjudicatory hearings and render them ineffective as a means of utiliz-
ing agency expertise."''. In spite of the FDA's discretion to determine
whether a drug product was "new," however, once qualified, the
agency was not relieved of satisfying the Act's procedural require-
ments. "3
Similar to the FDA's authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, the Attorney General has the explicit authority under
the INA to promulgate regulations managing immigration adjudica-
tion."' He issued the streamlining regulations under this authority,
with the purpose of improving the BIA's adjudicatory process and
reducing an overwhelming backlog of cases. Although this intention
may implicate "procedural" concerns such as the agency's case-
management techniques, Weinberger illustrates that a binding regula-
tion's directive must be observed even when the procedure was ini-
Accordingly, because the streamlining rules are published in the Code of Federal Regulations,
this provides a "snippet" of evidence but is no longer determinative of the legislative rule label.
107 512 F2d 688 (2d Cir 1975).
108 21 USC § 301 et seq (2000).
109 21 USC § 371.
110 See Weinberger, 512 F2d at 697.
111 Id at 697.
112 Id at 697-98.
113 See id at 702-04 (assessing whether the Commissioner's actions were arbitrary and
capricious in light of the Act's requirements).
114 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 1101 et seq. See also text accompanying
note 13.
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tially implemented to "avoid endless delays." Furthermore, it is well
established that once binding rules are issued, they must be followed
by the agency and given full effect by the courts."5 Therefore, although
individual Board members may have minimal discretion to decide
when the factual determinations required by the regulations are pre-
sent, neither the BIA nor the courts can disregard the regulations'
mandate to issue an AWO when these conditions are met.
C. The Classification of the AWO Procedure as a Legislative Rule
Resolves the Split
Part III.A explained why Chaney does not solve the problem of
reviewability in the case of a Board member's decision to affirm with-
out opinion. It concluded that an alternate framework is necessary to
resolve the circuit split. Part III.B provided the foundation for this
framework by establishing that the AWO procedure is a legislative
rule. This Part builds upon that basis to propose that the courts should
consider the AWO procedure's binding strength to reconcile the split.
It argues that because the regulations are legislative, the decision to
affirm without opinion is not committed to agency discretion by law,
and judicial review is available to ensure the agency complies with its
obligations.
This framework focuses on the relationship between legislative
rules and discretionary action. Once an agency chooses to limit its dis-
cretion by promulgating binding rules, the agency's application
thereof should be considered nondiscretionary. This is because certain
criteria must be met before any action can be taken. Furthermore, the
nature of legislative rules as restrictions on an agency's ability to exer-
cise its delegated power implies that the rules themselves will typically
set forth discernable standards controlling the agency's discretion.
And, because it is well recognized that binding, identifiable standards
may provide the judiciary with adequate guidance to review an
115 See Accardi v Shaughnessy, 347 US 260, 268 (1954) (vacating a deportation order of the
BIA because the procedure leading to the order did not conform to the relevant regulations);
Arizona Grocery Co v Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co, 284 US 370, 389-90 (1932)
(standing for the proposition that an administrative agency's ruling, until changed, binds both the
outside world and the agency; moreover, the agency is obliged to adhere to its existing regula-
tions when adjudicating and may not make ad hoc exceptions or departures). See also Nader v
Bork, 366 F Supp 104, 108 (D DC 1973) ("It is settled beyond dispute that under such circum-
stances [as where a procedural rule is binding] an agency regulation has the force and effect of
law, and is binding upon the body that issues it.").
116 See, for example, Montilla v INS, 926 F2d 162,168-70 (2d Cir 1991) (reversing a decision
by the BIA for failing to follow its own regulatory procedures regarding a petitioner's right to
counsel in a deportation hearing).
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agency's compliance,'" this Comment contends that the categorization
of the AWO procedure as a binding legislative rule strongly implies that
a Board member's decision to streamline is both nondiscretionary and
subject to review.
This Comment, however, does not claim that any given agency's
application of a legislative rule is per se nondiscretionary. Binding
rules will not always create enough "law to apply" for reviewing courts
to conduct a meaningful review of the agency's compliance. For ex-
ample, in Center for Auto Safety v Dole,"' the D.C. Circuit acknowl-
edged that it "previously held that regulations promulgated by an ad-
ministrative agency in carrying out its statutory mandate can provide
standards for judicial review of agency action. '"9 Nevertheless, the court
found that the binding regulation at issue did not furnish it with ade-
quate standards for review. This is because the regulation in Center for
Auto Safety directed the administrative agency to "tak[e] into account
appropriate factors, which may include, among others, allocation of
agency resources, agency priorities and the likelihood of success in
litigation which might arise from the order" to commence investiga-
tion against automobile manufacturers for safety defects in automo-
biles.l ° Yet the regulation did not purport to state how the agency
should balance the factors contained in the regulation, and therefore
the court concluded that it had no judicially manageable standards by
which to review the agency's decision."'
Center for Auto Safety is an example of an agency's application of
a legislative rule that is not reviewable because the law does not ade-
quately guide a reviewing court in its assessment of the agency's com-
pliance. In Center for Auto Safety, the language of the relevant regula-
tion indicates that the agency can either consider the listed factors or
disregard them if it so chooses. In contrast, in order for a Board mem-
ber to properly streamline a case, the Board member must find:
(1) the "result reached in the decision under review was correct;"
(2) any "errors in the decision under review were harmless or
117 See Vitarelli v Seaton, 359 US 535,539-40 (1959) (establishing that binding regulations
can provide standards for judicial review of agency action); Service v Dulles, 354 US 363, 388
(1957) (finding that when an agency imposed upon itself binding regulations, it could not "pro-
ceed without regard to them"). See also Ngure, 367 F3d at 982 (acknowledging an agency's bind-
ing regulations may provide the requisite law to apply for judicial review).
118 846 F2d 1532 (DC Cir 1988).
119 Id at 1534.
120 49 CFR § 552.8 (1987).
121 Center for Auto Safety, 846 F2d at 1534-35 (finding that because the "regulation at issue
permitted agency consideration of non-safety factors" and there was "no way to second-guess
the weight or priority to be assigned these elements," the regulation failed to provide judicially
manageable standards that would enable review).
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nonmaterial;" and (3) "(A) [t]he issues on appeal are squarely
controlled by existing Board or federal court precedent
and do not involve the application of precedent to a novel factual
situation" or "(B) [t]he factual and legal issues raised on appeal
are not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a
written opinion in the case. '
These three conditions supply the agency and the courts with a precise
framework circumscribing a Board member's authority to issue an
AWO decision. Such limitations also imply that the decision to affirm
without opinion is nondiscretionary by virtue of the fact that the
agency's choice of proceeding is tightly cabined by the case's factual
underpinnings.
The Ninth Circuit in Chong Shin Chen v Ashcroft' implicitly
supported this conclusion through its analysis of whether a streamlin-
ing decision is discretionary by nature:
Application of subsection (A) of the streamlining regulation is
clearly non-discretionary, as it can only be invoked when "the is-
sue on appeal is squarely controlled by existing Board or federal
court precedent and does not involve the application of prece-
dent to a novel fact situation." Application of subsection (B) is
also not discretionary. It can only be invoked when the factual
and legal issues presented are "insubstantial." While the agency's
determination that the issues presented are "insubstantial" will
often warrant deference, at times that determination would be
absurd, as in this case."'
This interpretation implies that although there may be a minimal
amount of discretion involved in choosing to streamline a case, this
discretion is constrained by the BIA's regulatory scheme. Thus,
"[w]hile the regulation does not provide guidance on how the [agency]
is to 'weigh' or 'balance' the factors, it does provide a list of objective
criteria that the decisionmaker is required to consider in evaluating
122 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4)(i). There seems to be a disagreement amongst the circuits over
whether all three of these criteria must be satisfied before a Board member may issue an AWO.
Compare Smriko, 387 F3d at 292 ("All three of these criteria must be met in order for a case
properly to be streamlined."), with Ngure, 367 F3d at 987 ("The regulations do specify that one
of several enumerated circumstances must be present before the BIA is permitted to employ a
three-member panel.") (emphasis added). Primarily because of the use of the conjunction "and"
between the second and third criteria, this Comment assumes that all three conditions must be
satisfied for the BIA to properly affirm without opinion.
123 378 F3d 1081 (9th Cir 2004).
124 Id at 1088.
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[the relevant inquiry]."' ' And, because the touchstone of the courts'
review is to determine "whether the decision was based on a consid-
eration of the relevant factors,''26 the exacting criteria set forth by the
streamlining regulations provides a meaningful and objective standard
by which the courts can judge a Board member's decision to affirm
without opinion.
A counterargument to this last assertion is that the regulations offer
only a vague standard by which to evaluate a Board member's action.
That is, although the term "substantial" is qualified in the regulation by
the requirement that the issues be "so substantial" as to warrant the issu-
ance of a written opinion, this qualification (of when a written opinion is
mandated) is itself not defined by the regulations. A Board member's
determination is instead discretionary. ' Although it is true that the regu-
lations do not require a written opinion in any specified situation, it is not
true that the regulations leave a Board member with no guidance on the
matter. An opinion may be written when a Board member issues a "brief
order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under review," or
when the Board member "designates the case for decision by a three-
member panel."' Additionally, the regulations set forth six circumstances
for when three-member review is appropriate.9 These provisions there-
fore help qualify the term "written opinion" and supply the courts
with a standard against which to judge a Board member's determina-
tion of "substantial."
D. Application of the Proposed Framework to the Circuit Split
This Comment argues that categorizing a rule as legislative pro-
vides the courts with a framework to resolve the circuit split. Because
the streamlining regulations are binding, they require the agency and
the courts to comply with their preconditions. In turn, the BIA's deci-
sion to streamline is nondiscretionary. Furthermore, because the regu-
lations list explicit criteria to guide the agency in its choice of proceed-
ing, the court's holding in Center for Auto Safety is inapplicable. Thus,
if the agency fails to consider a stated factor, a petitioner has grounds
to appeal and the court must inquire whether the choice made was
125 McAlpine v United States, 112 F3d 1429,1434 (10th Cir 1997). See also Turri v INS, 997
F2d 1306, 1308-09 (10th Cir 1993) (holding that, provided that the administrative agency "con-
siders all the relevant factors, [the] court cannot second-guess the weight, if any, to be given any
factor" where no weight is prescribed in the law).
126 Overton Park, 401 US at 416.
127 For a discussion of this argument, see Ngure, 367 F3d at 986-87 (concluding that "there
is no manageable standard for judicial review" regarding whether issues presented to the BIA
are "so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion").
128 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(5).
129 See id § 1003.1(e)(6).
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"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law."'
The proposed framework has two distinct advantages. First, it
supplies the courts with a manageable standard of review, addressing
the question left open by Chaney. Specifically, as discussed in Part
III.A, it is likely that the presumption against reviewability of nonen-
forcement decisions gives way when an agency takes affirmative ac-
tion authorized by a binding regulation. Second, the framework ac-
counts for the regulation's binding effect on the agency's adjudication
proceedings. In doing so, it aligns the findings of the courts involved in
the circuit split. To illustrate this effect, this Part examines two cases
that raise significant issues within the split-Haoud v Ashcroft" and
Ngure v Ashcroft.'2
In Haoud, the First Circuit addressed whether the Board cor-
rectly followed its regulatory scheme when it issued an AWO deci-
sion.'33 This inquiry required a threshold determination that the court
had jurisdiction to review the Board member's decision. The basis
upon which the First Circuit asserted its jurisdiction was by compari-
son to Chaney, and by reference to the regulations themselves.'
First, the court distinguished its case from Chaney because the
BIA's own regulations provided sufficient guidelines for the court to
review a Board member's decision to affirm without opinion.' 3 More-
over, the court emphasized that "[e]specially when the Board's review
of an IJ's decision often hinges on circuit court precedent, [the court
is] well-equipped, both statutorily and practically, to review a decision
to streamline....6 Thus, because the regulations served as a roadmap
delineating when a Board member could properly issue an AWO deci-
sion, and because the court was familiar with its own precedent, the
First Circuit decided in favor of jurisdiction over the challenge.
130 5 USC § 706(2)(A). See also INS v Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 US 26,32 (1996):
Though the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and follows-by
rule or by settled course of adjudication-a general policy by which its exercise of discre-
tion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed al-
teration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as "arbitrary, capricious, [or]
an abuse of discretion" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.
131 350 F3d 201 (1st Cir 2003).
132 367 F3d 975 (8th Cir 2004).
133 See 350 F3d at 205 (finding that the court had jurisdiction and remanding the case back
to the BIA because the court could not determine whether the BIA properly reviewed the peti-
tioner's case).
134 See id at 206-07 (finding that, unlike in Chaney, the applicable regulation provided the
court with a judicially manageable standard to enable review, and that the regulation was binding).
135 See id. See also 8 CFR § 1003.1(e)(4) (setting out the guidelines for affirming without
opinion the decision of the Department of Homeland Security or the IJ).
136 Haoud, 350 F3d at 206.
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Next, in deciding whether the BIA properly employed an AWO
decision, the First Circuit explained: "As the regulation clearly sets
out, 'Except as they may be modified or overruled by the Board or the
Attorney General, decisions of the Board shall be binding on all offi-
cers and employees of the Service or Immigration Judges in the ad-
ministration of the Act.'""37 This language is significant because it ex-
plicitly acknowledges that the decisions of the BIA are binding. While
this conclusion is the same as the outcome proposed under the new
framework, the First Circuit makes no mention of the implications of
a regulation's binding effect in the context of judicial review. Instead,
the court claims that the AWO procedure is reviewable because the
streamlining regulations provide manageable standards for the pur-
poses of review. However, were the court to address the binding na-
ture of the AWO procedure as a legislative rule, it would begin its
analysis supported by a strong precedent for the reviewability of bind-
ing norms.18
In contrast to Haoud, in Ngure the Eighth Circuit commenced its
analysis by acknowledging the potential effect of a binding regulation.
It noted that "the judiciary may in certain contexts review an agency's
compliance with its own regulations when the regulations impose
binding norms on the agency."'' 9 The court then indicated that its
touchstones for determining when an agency's regulations intended to
bind discretion were the context and the language of the regulation. "'
As for the context of the immediate case, the court emphasized that
"an administrative agency's decision about how to allocate its scarce
resources to accomplish its complex mission traditionally has been
free from judicial supervision.'"' The court cited the Supreme Court
case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v NRDC," to support
this assertion." But Vermont Yankee was decided on a different level
of generality than Haoud and Ngure. Specifically, Vermont Yankee
stands for the proposition that "Congress intended that the discretion
of agencies and not that of the courts be exercised in determining
when extra procedural devices should be employed."'" And, while this
general maxim of administrative law is certainly relevant to the circuit
137 Id at 207, quoting 8 CFR § 1003.1(g) (emphasis added).
138 See Nader, 366 F Supp at 108 (establishing that once binding norms are issued the courts
have jurisdiction to review the agency's compliance). See also notes 115, 117, and accompanying
text.
139 Ngure, 367 F3d at 982.
140 See id.
141 Id at 983.
142 435 US 519 (1978).
143 Id at 544 ("[Ajgencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.").
144 Id at 546 (emphasis omitted).
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split, the question at issue in the split is not the validity of the AWO as
an "extra procedural device.'..5 Instead, it is whether the appellate
courts may review the BIA's decision to apply the AWO procedure in
any given case. This determination does not require a simple state-
ment of an agency's ability to define its own rules, but rather an ex-
amination of the jurisdictional issue in light of the regulation's binding
strength on the agency and the courts.
Next, the court considered the "text, structure, and history" of the
AWO procedure and concluded that "the Attorney General surely did
not intend to create substantive rights for aliens in the determination
whether a particular decision of an IJ was affirmed without opinion."'
'6
As evidence, the court noted the regulation's initial reason for imple-
mentation, namely administrative efficiency. ' This led the court to
classify the rule as "procedural" and to decline review on the basis
that review of an agency's decision is generally limited when "a proce-
dural rule is designed primarily to benefit the agency carrying out its
functions," rather than "intended primarily to confer important proce-
dural benefits upon individuals."' But although the Eighth Circuit
correctly pointed out that the AWO regulation has a procedural func-
tion (to streamline the agency's review process), the court's distinction
between "procedural" and "substantive" does not withstand close
analysis.'9
Although the streamlining regulations are procedural directives,
the rules were also promulgated in part to ensure the quality of the
agency's adjudications; the regulations were designed not only to ad-
dress the agency's extensive backlog of cases and lengthy delays
(which encouraged abuse of the system and imposed a particular bur-
den on those who merited relief from deportation), but they also en-
abled the BIA to focus more attention and resources on those cases
presenting significant issues for resolution."' And although exceptions
145 See note 37 and accompanying text (noting that the majority of federal courts have held
that the AWO procedure does not violate due process, thus the constitutional validity of the
procedure is no longer in question).
146 Ngure, 367 F3d at 983.
147 See id at 983-84.
148 Id at 982-83, quoting American Farm Lines v Black Ball Freight Service, 397 US 532,
538-39 (1970).
149 The Supreme Court has held that agencies are bound by regulations intended to ensure
that fair factfinding procedures are provided before the agency acts against an individual. See
generally Vitarelli, 359 US 535 (invalidating the dismissal of an Interior Department employee
after a hearing that lacked required safeguards): Service, 354 US 363 (invalidating the Secretary
of State's dismissal of an employee without the required approval of the Deputy Undersecretary
and consultation of the hearing record); Accardi 347 US 260 (invalidating a deportation because the
required appeal on the suspension of deportation was improperly conducted).
150 See Part I.B (discussing the streamlining regulations).
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to the general rule that agencies are expected to follow their regula-
tions have been permitted where the regulation in question concerns
only internal agency procedures, the AWO regulation fits no such ex-
ception.' Therefore even if the regulation instituting the AWO proce-
dure does not go so far as to create any substantive rights for aliens, it
is not merely a procedural rule that facilitates internal housekeeping.
As a result, the courts must insist on the agency's compliance with the
conditions of the rule.'52
The proposed framework would adjust the way in which each of
these courts approached the issue of judicial review. Yet if the courts
agreed that the AWO rule is legislative and subsequently gave weight
to the effect of this classification on the agency's adjudicatory discre-
tion, this Comment contends that the courts should come to the same
conclusion regarding jurisdiction: that courts may review whether a
Board member properly applied the AWO regulation.
CONCLUSION
The circuit split involves a disagreement over when administra-
tive action is committed to agency discretion by law. In their analyses
of this issue, the courts rely on the judicially created doctrine of "no
law to apply," emanating primarily from Chaney. This reliance, how-
ever, is misguided largely because Chaney left open the possibility that
courts could review agency applications of their own binding regula-
tory policies."' Because the BIA's streamlining regulations are both
published in the Code of Federal Regulations and promulgated as a
result of a valid exercise of legislative authority, the rules are legisla-
tive and thus binding on the BIA and the courts. Chaney therefore
cannot control the jurisdictional analysis. Instead, this Comment pro-
poses that the binding effect of the streamlining regulations should
guide the courts' decision as to whether the issuance of an AWO is
committed to agency discretion by law. Specifically, because the regu-
lation that creates the AWO procedure is a binding rule that con-
strains a Board member's ability to deviate from the prescribed condi-
tions, the decision to streamline a case is not committed to agency dis-
cretion and is thus subject to judicial review.
151 See, for example, American Farm Lines, 397 US at 538-39 (involving rules promulgated
to assist an agency in compiling information for internal decisionmaking).
152 The Eighth Circuit itself implicitly acknowledged the rule's ability to impose obligations
on the agency when it insisted that the regulations specifically prohibited a Board member from
offering any reasoning for its decision to affirm without opinion. See Ngure, 367 F3d at 984. See
also notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
153 See Bhagwat, 72 Notre Dame L Rev at 171 (cited in note 86) (noting that Chaney left
open the possibility of judicial review when legislative rules were present).
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